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Block: Qualified Immunity

QUALIFIED EIMMUNITY:
A VIEW FROM THE BENCH
HonorableFredericBlock*
Honorable George C. Pratt:
Our next speaker is Judge Frederic Block. Judge Block is
somewhat unique, one of only a few judges of the Eastern District
of New York, and probably elsewhere in the country these days,
who came to the bench by way of private practice rather than by
being a prosecutor or a judge in some other court. The subject for
us is a view from the bench.
HonorableFredericBlock
Well, George, I think that is probably what is unique about me.
Nobody ever has the foggiest notion of what I am going to say! I
know the hour is late and this is one of the unique opportunities you
have to walk out on a federal court judge without having to worry
about being sanctioned. I will try to make it as interesting as
possible.
Initially, I have to give some recognition to my colleague, Judge
Raggi.' I am really, in effect, her surrogate. If not for Judge
Raggi, I would not have the opportunity to make this presentation,
because she would be here today instead of me. Why is that? I
guess one thing I can share with you is one of the practical things
"Honorable Frederic Block is a United States District Court Judge, Eastern
District of New York. A graduate of Cornell Law School, he has litigated
cases on every level of the state and federal court systems. He successfully
argued the first local "one person-one vote" reapportionment case in the
Supreme Court of the United States, which led to the creation of the Suffolk
County Legislature. He has served as the President of the Suffolk County Bar
Association and Vice President of the New York State Bar Association, and is
a founder of the Suffolk Academy of Law. As a counterbalance to his legal
activities, he is also a composer/lyricist of satirical revues, including the 1986
Off-Broadway show, "Professionally Speaking."
I Honorable Reena Raggi is a United States District Court Judge, Eastern
District of New York.
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that happens from the perspective of judges when we get cases that
have to be processed.
You all know, I guess by now, everything there is to know about
qualified immunity.2 You have heard lectures, and have been
practicing in the area. It would be inappropriate, certainly
redundant, if I were to go over the qualified immunity legal
landscape. When I came on the bench, the Crown Heights Civil
Rights case' was pending. I inherited that case as part of our
wonderful system of case assignments to new judges. I really have
respect for Judge Raggi, before, during, and after all of this,
because if she was inclined to do so, she could have kept that case,
as it was her case initially. Frankly, Judge Raggi, thank you for
letting me have the opportunity to be here today and speak in your
place.
HonorableReena Raggi:
You have no idea how true that is. Usually Marty likes to assign
me to the late time period. These are the steps you have to take to
avoid that.
HonorabeFredericBloclc.
Well, if Judge Raggi had granted qualified immunity in the Crown
Heights case, I would not be here today. Judge Raggi decided that
it was not up to her to decide the issue of qualified immunity and
that the parties would have to engage in discovery. 4 After almost
2 See

generally Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 975 F. Supp. 206

(E.D.N.Y. 1997). Judge Block defined qualified immunity as an affirmative
defense that "generally shields governmental officials from liability for
damages on account of their performance of discretionary official functions
'insofar as their conduct does not violate- clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."' Id. at
215 (further citations omitted).
3 id.
'Id. at 214. Judge Raggi "denied the motion, determining implicitly that
plaintiffs had pleaded cognizable claims, and commenting that the case was not
ripe for summary judgment at that early stage because of the need for
discovery." Id.
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five years of discovery, depositions, and so on through the
wonderful case management system involving the magistrate
judges, I finally got my hooks into the case. We brought it to a
head, and soon thereafter, we rendered our decision on qualified
immunity.5 So what are we talking about? We are talking about the
Crown Heights case.' Everybody knows about the criminal aspect
of it. That was certainly something that appeared in the press many
times over for years. I guess a quietus to that has recently been
served by the conviction of Lemrick Nelson. Nelson is the person
who was initially prosecuted on the state level, before we
federalized the prosecution for our colleague Judge Trager.'
Honorable George C. Pratt.
Fred, some people do not know the background of that case.
HonorableFredericBlock:
All right. When I discuss the Crown Heights case, I am talking
about the civil disturbance that happened as a result of the
unfortunate situation in the Hassidic community where the young
African-American child, Cato, was killed in an unfortunate
automobile accident.9 As a result of that event, the black
community acted out, retaliated to some extent, invaded, you might
say, the Crown Heights environment, causing a lot of property

' Id. at 226 (holding that "the motion by Dinkins and Brown for dismissal of
all federal claims against them on qualified immunity grounds is granted.").
6 Id. at 208-09. The Crown Heights case arose "out of the unrest that
gripped the Crown Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn between Monday,
August 19 and Thursday, August 22, 1991 .... " Id.
' People v. Nelson, 167 Misc. 2d 665, 647 N.Y.S.2d 438 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
Kings County 1995).
'U.S. v. Nelson, 921 F. Supp. 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
' Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 209. "An automobile escorting the late
Lubavitcher Rebbe Menachem Schneerson accidentally struck and killed
seven-year-old Gavin Cato." Id.
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damage, some physical injury to people and, most tragically,
stabbed to death, Yankel Rosenbaum.'"
While the criminal case was being processed, some individual
plaintiffs from the Hassidic community (it did not involve a class
action), brought this civil rights case against the City of New York,
and specifically against Mayor Dinkins and then Police
Commissioner Brown."
The theory of liability against the defendants was two-fold. First,
there was a violation of due process 2 on the theory that Dinldns and
Brown and whoever else was involved in the policing process did
not, in effect, take any action to quell the disturbances that were
happening as a result of the death of Cato in the Crown Heights
community. 3 And not only that, the issue was, specifically, that
Dinkins and Brown allegedly adopted a policy of restraint, rather
than to be more proactively involved in quelling the riots and the
disturbances that were happening back in the Crown Heights
4
community.
This is basically the background. I thought perhaps that most of
you knew about it. When I speak to people, as soon as I mention
Crown Heights, they recall that unfortunate situation.
So now, years later, we had to decide whether the former mayor
and the former police commissioner could be subject to individual
liability for their actions or inactions in the course of that
regrettable civil disturbance. And that specifically was the subject
" Id. "Within hours of Cato's death, Australian rabbinical student Yankel
Rosenbaum was attacked by a group of young African-American men and
stabbed to death." Id.
11Id.
12 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law." Id.
3
Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 216. "Plaintiffs claim that their due process
rights were violated by the City's alleged implementation of a policy of
restraint ....
" Id.
4
d. "Specifically, [the plaintiffs] charge that by failing to arrest individuals
for unlawful assembly and by ignoring pleas for assistance both by individuals
and by the community at large, the Police Department emboldened participants
in the violence and increased the danger to the Hassidic community." Id.
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of the decision that I rendered in the Rosenbawn case which is in
your materials.' 5
What was interesting, I guess, about all of this, is that it was a
veritable tour deforce involving all the issues that you can possibly
conjure up when you talk about the application of the principles of
qualified immunity.
As you all know, the first assessment that has to be made is to
determine and discern what the claimed constitutional right is
before we can decide whether or not that right was clearly
established, and whether or not the state acted in an objectively
reasonable way under the applicable standard. What was the
constitutional right? To make that determination, it is necessary to
get into the substantive aspects of the law.
Basically, the claim of the plaintiffs was, as I mentioned earlier,
that a due process right was allegedly violated. The plaintiffs
wanted to go to trial on the theory that Dinkins and Brown and the
other police involved actually created or increased the risk of
danger to the residents and the plaintiffs in the Crown Heights
community by not taking action to quell the riots in the first
instance.t6 There was a policy of restraint that the mayor adopted at
the time, and I think that probably is true. The issue is whether or
not the Mayor could constitutionally, lawfully, stand by, exercise
this restraint, and allow the disturbances to go unquelled for two or
three days without being held personally accountable in litigation.7
That basically was the issue.
So, what is fascinating about this is the issue of whether there is a
constitutional right, and if so, what are the contours of this
constitutional right?
In the first part of our analysis we are dealing with civil
disobedience, riots and things of that nature. Of course, we had to
analyze the law first in the context of whether there was a
constitutional right in existence at the time.

Is
Id.
16
17

id.
id.
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So, naturally, we had to go back to consider DeShaney,18 where
the Supreme Court announced the broad proposition that the state
or state actors cannot be held liable if they do nothing at all, and
just remain passive. 9
Specifically, the holding of DeShaney is that the due process laws
do not require the state to protect the life, liberty and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors.' In that case, there was
a child abuse situation and the state did not intervene. 2 The state
could not be held liable according to the majority opinion 2
That was the conceptual beginning, and two years after the Crown
Heights disturbances, the Second Circuit spoke on the issue in a
case called Dwares v. City of New York.?
There, in a very simple fact pattern involving a motion to dismiss
a complaint, the complaint alleged that the police stood by while
there was a park disturbance with skinheads allegedly beating up
people, while the police were watching.2 The complaint alleged
that the individuals had the approbation and approval of the police
because the police and the skinheads had agreed and/or conspired to
let the harassment and assault of flag burners continue as long as it
did not get totally out of control.2?
'8 DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Svcs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989) (holding that generally "a State's failure to protect an individual against
private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due Process
Clause.").
191d. at 197. See also Pearson v. Miller, 988 F. Supp. 848 (M.D. Pa.
1997). "In general, there is no constitutional duty on the part of the state to
protect citizens from abuses or crimes committed by other private citizens."
Id. at 852.
2 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
2 Id. at 189. In DeShaney, a young boy suffered repeated beatings from his
father. Id. While county child welfare authorities were indeed alerted and
took steps to protect the child, he was never taken into protective custody. Id.
"Eventually, the father beat the child to the point where he suffered permanent
brain damage and the mother sued the county for failure to protect her son.
Id.
22 ld. at 202.
2 985 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1993).
24Id. at96.
'2 Id. at 97.
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The Second Circuit, commenting on DeShaney, created what we
now refer to as the "State-created danger" due process right.26
Specifically, the Second Circuit read DeShaney as providing for a
due process right when the state "[uin some way had assisted in
creating or increasing the danger to the victim. " '
The Second Circuit allowed the complaint to survive because of
allegations that the police actually were conspiring with the
skinheads, permitting them to act up a little bit, so long as they
stayed in control. That was enough to create a factual issue that
could go forward as to whether or not the activity by the police
created or increased the danger to victims?2
That happened in 1993. What about the Crown Heights
disturbance? So, we had to decide, first of all, was there a
constitutional right? And we held yes, there was a constitutional
right?
Basically, I stated that if the plaintiffs contend simply that the City
failed to respond to requests from the Hassidic community for
additional police protection due to the Crown Heights disturbances,
such a claim would arguably be barred by DeShaney, which was
decided two years before the Crown Heights disturbances.?
I said, however, that the thrust of the plaintiffs' argument was
different. They alleged that the defendants, by the inappropriate
implementation of a policy of restraint simply by Dinkins and the
police commissioner, actually exacerbated the danger to the
Hassidic community and rendered the community more vulnerable
to violence by private actors, maling reference to Dwares2'

' Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 975 F. Supp. 206, 218
(E.D.N.Y. 1997).
ZDwares, 985 F.2d at99.
Id. "Thus in the present case, the complaint asserted that the defendant
officers, indeed had made the demonstrators more vulnerable to assaults." Id.
'Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 218.
30 Id.at 217.
"' Id. "In Dwares ...the Second Circuit read DeShaney as providing for a
due process right in those circumstances where the state 'in some way had
assisted in creating or increasing the danger to the victim.'" Id. (citing
Dwares v. City of New York, 985 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1993)).
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So, I just wondered and I do not think the case has yet come
before any court, if you have abject civil disturbance and the police
are there on the scene and they take no action and there is no
particular policy whatsoever, but they see violence and their
presence is prominent, does the mere presence of the police act to
embolden the actors to the point where the rioters can say, "Look
we're sanctioned here. We can go ahead because the police are not
really effectively interfering. They are standing there. They are
watching us." How that would play out, I do not know.
Can you bring litigation whenever you have any civil disturbance,
and if so, to what extent do you say that the state actors have aided
the third parties, have emboldened them, have increased the risk of
danger?
All of those issues are subsumed in this scenario. What was
initially fascinating, before we even got to the analysis of qualified
immunity, was to identify the state constitutional right, because you
have to start off with that before you decide whether or not it was
clearly established, and whether or not it was objectively reasonable
behavior on the part of the individuals who are being sued. 2
I do not know what the disturbance law will be in the future but
we came very close to the issue in Crown Heights. I let the
complaint survive because I thought there were sufficient
allegations and sufficient evidence there to warrant the case going
forward to trial before a jury against the City of New York on the
issue of whether the proactive actions of Dinkins and Brown
actually did create danger or increase the risk of danger.
Now, we also gave Dinkins and Brown qualified immunity. 3 I
read about the case in the paper afterwards. I guess as a political
person, Dinkins won by putting the best spin on things. He told the
press that Judge Block found that he was not at all responsible for
this situation and that the court completely exonerated him. Of
course we know that is not so, since we know that the concept of a
32 See Roniger v. McCall, 22 F. Supp.2d 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
"In
determining the availability of a qualified immunity defense, the rights alleged
to have been violated must be identified, and a determination as to whether
they were 'clearly established' must be made." Id. at 162 (citing Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
33
Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 226.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss4/20

8

Block: Qualified Immunity

1999

QUALIFIEDI4MUNITY

1597

person's constitutional right is one thing, and whether the individual
is entitled to qualified immunity is something entirely different."
We need to understand that there is a difference in the dichotomy
between the right that we are talking about and whether or not the
jury can find that right was violated on one hand, and the separate
and discrete issue of whether qualified immunity should nonetheless
attach to the individuals who are allegedly individually responsible.
I let the case go forward against the City. Why is it that we gave
qualified immunity to Dinkins and Brown? Well, basically we
applied the basic qualified immunity law.I
Initially, we had to decide even though there was a constitutional
right that, under Dwares and DeShaney, had to be litigated,
whether the contours of that right were so sufficiently defined and
understood that they would be clearly established. Therefore we
had to examine established law and decide the case on that basis in
terms of the qualified immunity analysis.
How then, do we establish whether or not the law was clearly
established and the contours of a constitutional right? Well, we are
told by the Second Circuit that we have to look at the Supreme
Court cases and other circuit cases in the country to see whether the
right was reasonably specified, so to speak, and to sort of get a
sense of what is out there." We had to make that type of inquiry in
4Id. at 215. "A decision on qualified immunity is separate and distinct from

the merits of the case ....

Immunity contemplates exemption from liability

that would otherwise exist on the merits." Id. (citing Lassiter v. Alabama, 28
F.3d 1146, 1151 (11th Cir. 1994)).
' See generally Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). Under this
doctrine, "public officials are shielded from liability for civil damages if they

establish that (1) their conduct did not violate clearly established rights of
which a reasonable person would have known; or (2) that it was 'objectively
reasonable to believe that their acts did not violate clearly established rights.'"
Glendora v. Pinkerton See. and Detective Serv., 25 F. Supp.2d 447, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
3
Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 218. To determine whether a constitutional
right is clearly established, consider the following factors:
(1) whether the right in question was defined with "reasonable
specificity"; (2) whether the decisional law of the Supreme Court and

the applicable circuit court support the existence of the right in question
and (3) whether under preexisting law a reasonable defendant official
would have understood that his or her acts were unlawful.
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the context of this case to determine whether this constitutional
right was clearly established. We held that it was not, that in
Dwares the right existed, but the contours of that right were not
clearly established. It is rare to go through this type of exercise
because usually rights are pretty clearly established.
The second part of the litigation dealt with the claim that there
was a violation of the equal protection rights of the Hassidim, of the
Jewish people.37 There were allegations that Dinkins and Brown
had some anti-Semitic leanings, that they favored the blacks to the
detriment of the Jewish folks, and that equal protection was clearly
established in that context.'
I felt, of course, that Dinldns' and Brown's actions were
objectively reasonable.39 The standard for objective reasonableness
is whether people similarly situated, other mayors, other police
officers, other police, if you are dealing with a police situation
generally, whether they can reasonably disagree with the action
taken by the official. ' If they can reasonably disagree, then the law
says that you have to find that their actions were objectively
reasonable.
So the issue of disagreement, I think, is paramount here. They
had testimony that was taken during the deposition process where
the officials said they thought the policy of restraint was indicated.
Other officials said, for example, "No, we should have gone in
there with a more aggressive policy right away, and if we had, all
of this property damage and personal injury could have been
prevented."
Even though a jury, if the case went to trial, could have
determined that there was a violation of the right, the judge
deciding the issue of qualified immunity could certainly determine
Id. (citing McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 1997)).
rh7d. at 224.

38id.
39 Id.

' See Kia P. v. McIntyre, 2 F. Supp.2d 281 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). "Even if the
scope of the plaintiff's rights and the defendant's conduct were established at

the time of the alleged violation, a government officer will nonetheless be
protected from liability if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on

the legality of the defendant's actions." Id. (further citations omitted).
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that there was a reasonable debate among people who were, under
similar circumstances, similarly positioned. I think that was pretty
clear in this case.
So I think that Dinkins and Brown should not have been held
personally responsible. I did not have to decide whether we had
qualified immunity on the basis of objective reasonableness because
I said the right was not clearly established. I did it somewhat
gratuitously, because who knows if the case will be appealed.
In the summary judgment qualified immunity arena, the collateral
order rule applies in the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit will
and does take jurisdiction even though it is technically a non-final
determination whenever summary judgment is denied.
There was a second substantive component to this case, as I
mentioned before, which was the equal protection argument." For
equal protection, one must assert a constitutional right that involves
a motive. 2 A subjective aspect was now interjected in the case.
Was Dinkins motivated to discriminate against the Jewish people?
That is the inherent equal protection issue of this particular case.
The right was clearly established.
There is no question that everybody knows you cannot
intentionally discriminate against any race, religion, minorities, et

cetera.43 But what was unique about this aspect of the case was
simply that we were dealing with the issue of how do you apply the
concept of objective reasonableness when you are dealing with a
constitutional right which says a principal element requires a
subjective aspect- namely, motive to discriminate.
The Second Circuit and other courts have wrestled with this
recently. The current posture of the Second Circuit requires, in
such situations, a particularized showing of discrimination- a

4'Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 223.
"It is well established that in order to prove an equal protection
I
id.
violation, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a discriminatory purpose was a
motivating factor in the government decision." Id. (further citation omitted).
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection Clause provides in
pertinent part: "[N]or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1999

11

Touro Law Review, Vol. 15, No. 4 [1999], Art. 20

1600

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 15

heightened standard." This was most recently reaffirmed by the
Second Circuit in a case called Hemphill v. Schote this past April."
The court in Hemphill stated, referring to the Dwares case, that
"where the state actors actually contributed to the vulnerability of
the plaintiff, or where the state actors aided and abetted a private
party in the deprivation of a plaintiff's civil rights, a violation of the
Due Process Clause does occur."47

This reinforces conceptually the concept of aiding and abetting in
the deprivation of civil rights and it continues discussing the
concept of particularized showing when you are dealing with

subjective elements as an essential aspect of your constitutional
claim entitlement.
I mention this because in Crawford-FL v. Britton," a case decided

three weeks after the Second Circuit decided Hemphill, the
Supreme Court held that there is no heightened evidentiary
requirement. 9 They rejected the clear and convincing standard
when dealing with a substantive constitutional claim that involves a
subjective element. 0

"See Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075 (3d Cir. 1995). In such situations, the
Second Circuit requires plaintiffs to "proffer particularized evidence of direct
or circumstantial facts. . . supporting the claim of an improper motive." Id.
at 1084.
41 141 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1998).
4Id.
The Second Circuit held that:
Hemphill's claim against the Officers under the Due Process Clause
should survive a claim of qualified immunity. "Where, as here, a
constitutional claim contains a subjective component, many courts
have imposed on plaintiffs what they describe as a heightened
standard, requiring them to provide specific allegations or direct
evidence of the required state of mind in order to avoid summary
judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity."
Id. at 419 (citing Blue v. Koren, 72 F.3d 1075, 1082-83 (2d Cir. 1995)).
7 Id.
4
118 S.Ct 1584 (1998).
41 Id. at 1596.
5 Id. at 1595. The Supreme Court commented that "[n]either the text of §
1983 or any other federal statute, nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
provides any support for imposing the clear and convincing burden of proof on
plaintiffs either at the summary judgment stage or in the trial itself." Id.
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Clearly, what effect does Crawford-FL have on the Second
Circuit's decisions? Recently, as you know, Heriphill seemed to
establish an extra responsibility or extra burden on the plaintiff to
show that there is some sort of heightened or particularized
showing that is necessary to sustain your case in the face of the
defendant's motion for summary judgment."
I am not so sure that the final word has been written on that
subject but I had to deal with it also in the context of Rosenbaum.
We found that there was no particularized showing because we
said that the plaintiffs had the burden, and they did not really come
forward and show that Dinkins and Brown really had any
anti-Semitic leanings.- There was not a sufficient particularized
showing to allow the case to go forward.
I want to give you a sense separate and apart from the intrigues of
the law in this area, which I find fascinating, about how we process
these matters as district court judges. Maybe I can make somewhat
of a special contribution, or particularized contribution here, to give
you some insight into what was already mentioned - that this case
was initially before Judge Raggi.
There was an early-on motion to dismiss. That was all right
because we know that qualified immunity should be shaken out of
the trees as quickly as possible in keeping with one of the
underlying concepts - that public officials should not have to sit by
and hire lawyers and spend a lot of grief, a lot of time, a lot of
energy, while the case is being litigated for three or four years on
the merits, before they can have the qualified immunity issue
determined.n

51 Hemphill,

141 F.3d at 419-20.

52 Estate of Rosenbaum v. City of New York, 975 F. Supp. 206 (E.D.N.Y.

1997). The Court found that "the evidence proffered by plaintiffs in support
of their claims that the policy was unusual or was discriminatorily motivated is
conclusory at best." Id. at 224.
5 Id. at 215.
"Qualified immunity protects government officials from the
burdens of defending expensive, but ultimately insubstantial, lawsuits and also
guards against the risk that 'fear of personal monetary liability and harassing
litigation will unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties.'" Id.
(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
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In this particular case, there was extensive pretrial discovery

because the whole process continued for four or five years.'

So the

application was originally made to Judge Raggi who denied the

motion of qualified immunity summary judgment, on the grounds
that there were a lot of facts that, in fairness to the parties,
particularly, in fairness to the plaintiffs, they should have an

opportunity to engage in discovery to see whether or not they
would be able to oppose that application.55
Judge Raggi invoked Rule 2656 and set the case for discovery,

quite wisely and correctly.7 District court judges have a lot of
power to deal with issues of immunity, short of having this matter

come to a full-blown litigation scenario.Let's discuss Rule 26 discovery powers.

discovery.59

We can have limited

If somebody has a real qualified immunity issue, you

' Id. at 214. "Approximately four years of discovery followed." Id.
55Id. "The Court did, however, dismiss the complaint as against the Police
Department because, as an agency of the City, it was not subject to separate
suit." Id. at 214n.10.
56
FED. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26 provides in pertinent part: "Except to the
extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall,
without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties [certain initial
disclosures]." Id. See also Crawford-EL v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).
"Rule 26 vests the trial judge with broad discretion to tailor discovery
narrowly and to dictate the sequence of discovery." Id.
' See generally Crawford-EL v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998). "Of
course, the judge should give priority to discovery concerning issues that bear
upon the qualified immunity defense, such as the actions that the official
actually took, since that defense should be resolved as early as possible. " Id.
at 1597.
' Rosenbaum, 975 F. Supp. at 215. "Provided that there are no material
issues of fact, the question of whether a reasonable officer should have known
that he or she acted unlawfully is a question for the Court and not for the jury
and
is properly resolved on a motion for summary judgment." Id.
59
FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(2). Rule 26 (b)(2) provides in pertinent part:
By order or by local rule, the court may alter the limits in these
rules on the number of depositions and interrogatories and may also
limit the length of depositions under Rule 30 and the number of
requests under Rule 36. The frequency or extent of use of the
discovery methods otherwise permitted under these rules and by any
local rule shall be limited by the court if it determines that: ... (iii)
the burden of expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
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have to come to the judge and get the judge's attention or the
magistrate judge's attention and say, "Look, let's have some
limited discovery. I do not want to be subject to the expense of an
enormous discovery schedule." We should focus - and in fact, it is
the appropriate decision to make on the discrete issues that deal
with the motion for qualified immunity and I will make a decision
as soon as we complete this discovery.6
Now sometimes discovery is not necessary. Sometimes it is
apparent on the face of a complaint, that the plaintiff has alleged
sufficient allegations, or that even if those allegations are true,
nonetheless you would be entitled to summary judgment. 61
Defendant can look at the complaint and make a 12(b)(6)1- motion
to dismiss and make a qualified immunity argument in the context
of that motion, prior to the answer. If the complaint is in such a
posture that summary judgment will be indicated well, so be it. If
it is not in that type of posture, defendant may want to submit some
documentary material to indicate that it is the type of case that does
not require any elaborate discovery. Defendant can ask the court to

benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery

in resolving the issues.
Id.
6'

Crawford, 118 S. Ct. at 1596. The Court stated:
When a plaintiff files a complaint against a public official alleging a
claim that requires proof of wrongful motive, the trial court must
exercise its discretion in a way that protects the substance of the
qualified immunity defense. It must exercise its discretion so that

officials are not subjected to unnecessary and burdensome discovery
or trial proceedings.

Id.
61 FED.

R. CIV. P. 56 (c).

Rule 56 (c) provides in pertinent part:

"The

judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,

if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." Id.
62

FED. R. CIV. P. 12 (b)(6).

Rule 12 (b)(6) provides in pertinent part:

"TIhe following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion:
...(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .... " Id.
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convert the 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment motion on
proper notice and deal with it on that basis.
Sometimes what is often overlooked, is that we have a Rule 43(e)
issue.0 Now, I have implemented this rule, but not in the context
of qualified immunity, though I think it can be employed whenever
there is a motion made before a district court judge.
We can have a separate, discrete, factual hearing on any particular
issue that might resolve the litigation. So, there are all of these
types of procedural tools that you can use and pull out of your tool
box to avoid having an extensive, elaborate trial until you actually
get to the heart of the issue that will decide your case. It is
particularly appropriate and recommended that these tools be used
when we talk about qualified immunity.
If there is no jury issue involved, and if there was just a simple,
factual inquiry that had to be explored before I can resolve the
summary judgment qualified immunity issue, I might implement
Rule 43(e).4 If there was a jury issue that was involved, which
invariably is the case, clearly, whether I can convene the jury just
to decide that one issue, I guess theoretically I can; though, I don't
think one would do it. It would be an awkward situation.
Theoretically, it can be done.
Judgment on the pleadings can be converted to motions for
summary judgment under 56 (c).6 Rule 56 specifically provides
that if summary judgment is not appropriate at the time that it is
made, it can be held in abeyance or it can be denied without leave
to reconstitute it." Many times I hold it in abeyance to have the
61FED. R. Civ. P. 43 (e). Rule 43 (e) provides in pertinent part: "When a
motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter
on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or depositions." Id.
6See
id.
65See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
"FED. R. CIrv. P. 56 (1). Rule 56 (f) provides in pertinent part:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion

that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
be had or may make such other order as is just.
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parties engage in discovery to give them the opportunity to explore
matters. '
So we have to be mindful of the fact that when dealing with
qualified immunity, one must think of how to get the issue resolved
early-on before the district court, and of what tools there are in the
tool box, the litigation tool box, the procedural tool box, that can be
pulled out in order to do this.
The Supreme Court, as I mentioned in Crawford-EL, specifically
refers to discovery technique, where we can shape and structure it,
so that we can focus on the issues that need to be focused upon to
resolve some qualified immunity matters.'
One may also require a reply under 7(a).4 There can be an
application to require the plaintiff to make a more definite and
specific statement under the federal rules. 0 This is another tool to
try to get the issue before the court.
Also, defendant can, if seeking to dismiss based upon qualified
immunity, tell the judge that defendant does not admit to the truth
of certain things, but for the purpose of qualified immunity
defendant will accept everything the plaintiff says as true. Let the
plaintiff put forth whatever the plaintiff believes is indicated to
Id.
£7

Crawford-EL v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584 (1998).

"The judge does,

however, have discretion to postpone ruling on a defendant's summary
judgment motion if the plaintiff needs additional discovery to explore 'facts
essential to justify the party's opposition.'" Id. at 1597 n.20 (citing FED. R.
Civ. P. 56 (f)).
'Id. at 1597.
61FED. R. Civ. P. 7 (a). Rule 7 (a) provides in pertinent part: "[Tihe court
may order a reply to an answer.... " Id.
Rule 12 (e) provides in pertinent part: "If a
70 FED. R. CIv. P. 12 (e).
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the
party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive
pleading . . . ." Id. See also Crawford-EL v. Britton, 118 S. Ct. 1584
(1998). The United States Supreme Court stated that "the court may resist that
the plaintiff 'put forward specific, nonconclusory factual allegations' that
establish improper motive causing cognizable injury in order to survive a
prediscovery motion for dismissal or summary judgment." Id. at 1596-97
(citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in judgment)).
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avoid qualified immunity, accept it as true, and in any event,
defendant will maintain that he or she is still entitled to qualified
immunity. And it does not mean that those facts are true, but given
the plaintiff s allegations, and given the plaintiff's position, the best
spin that possibly can be given all the inferences that the plaintiff is
entitled to, you can still reach the issue of qualified immunity.7'
Defendant should come to court and present these scenarios to the
court to get the matter resolved in the first instance.
From the plaintiff's perspective, I think the plaintiff would always
want to say that there are issues of fact, and that there are a number
of cases that have been decided on the grounds that qualified
immunity summary judgment is premature; that there are indeed
issues of fact which should preclude the award of qualified
immunity. So, plaintiff would always want to focus on that.
Plaintiff would have to make sure that the issue of fact that is
proposed to the court would truly make a difference.

7' Crawford-EL, 118 S. Ct. at 1597.

"To do so, the court must determine
whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs allegations, the official's conduct
violated clearly established law." Id.
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